AN ANALYSIS OF HOLINESS

Originally Published in: Religious Studies, Vol. 24, December 1988, pp. 511-528.

This inquiry is motivated by the question: if atheism is true, is it nevertheless the case that holiness or sacredness is exemplified? I believe the answer to this question is affirmative, and that the path to its affirmation lies in the rejection of the traditional assumption that holiness is a single and simple property of a divinity that eludes analysis. The opposite view, that there are several complex properties comprising holiness, makes it manifest that there are holy beings, even a holy ?supreme being?, even if there is no God and no gods.

The idea that holiness is a single and simple property uniquely exemplifiable by the divinity (and derivatively, by its earthly symbols or messengers, such as a ?holy icon? or a ?holy man?) is presupposed in most contemporary philosophies of religion. Philosophers in the analytic tradition often devote considerable space to analysing the divine properties of omniscience, omnipotence, etc., but feel nothing can be said about holiness and so confine themselves to simply listing it as among the properties of God.[1] Max Scheler, a representative of the Continental tradition fn the philosophy of religion, is more explicit about the unanalysability of holiness and writes that the modality of the holy and unholy ?form a unity of value-qualities not subject to further definitions[2] In his classic book on the holy, Rudolph Otto writes that religious holiness or the numinous ?completely eludes apprehension in terms of concepts?[3] and can only be studied indirectly by describing the emotions it evokes. The idea behind these various views is aptly summarized in a recent article by Charles Kielkopf:

It is now fairly common for social scientists, students of religion, and even text-book authors to use ?holy? or ?sacred? as a basic or primitive term to define or discuss the character of religion.[4] ... We need to use some undefined term such as ?sacred?, ?holy?, or ?numinous? to characterize religious belief and practice.[5]

In distinction from this traditional view, I believe that ?holiness?is analysable in two respects. To begin with, I believe that ?holiness? does not express a single property but several different and analogous properties; each of these analogous properties is expressed or at least is expressible by ?holiness? on a different occasion of its use. I shall call this respect in which ?holiness? is analysable its analogicity; the analogical analysis of ?holiness? aims to disengage the different properties it expresses and to specify the respect in which they are analogous.

The second respect in which ?holiness? is analysable concerns the complexity of what it expresses on each occasion of its use. In opposition to the view that ?holiness? expresses a simple property, I hold that each of the analogous properties it expresses is composed of other properties. Each of the analogous properties that constitutes the whole of what ?holiness? can express on some occasion of use is a complete property of holiness; of any item that exemplifies one of these complete properties it is true to say ?it is holy?. The parts of these properties are incomplete properties of holiness; if an item exemplifies some but not all of the incomplete properties that compose one of the complete properties, it is false to say of it ?it is holy?. The task of analyzing each of these complete properties of holiness into its parts I shall call the decompositional analysis of ?holiness?.

The main thrust of this paper is to show that there are four different but partially analogous complete properties of holiness, namely, religious holiness, moral holiness, individually relative holiness and metaphysical holiness. The respect in which they are analogous is twofold. First after all, the bearer of each of these properties, by virtue of bearing the property, is supreme in its class. What is religiously holy is supreme in the class of persons; the morally holy is supreme in the class of moral phenomena; what is holy relative to some individual person is supreme in the class of phenomena cherished by that person; what is metaphysically holy is supreme in the class of existents. ?Supremacy? must be understood here in a special sense. The supreme phenomenon is not merely in fact highest in its class, but is also the highest that is possible in its class. There could be nothing more excellent in that class than the holy phenomenon. It is the perfect member or one of the perfect members of the class.

But supremacy in its class cannot be the only respect in which the four complete properties are analogous, for many other items also possess this property but are not holy. Manifestly, the supreme item in the class of velocities, infinite velocity, is not holy. The second respect in which the four complete properties of holiness are analogous is that they are supremacies of the highest possible kind. The supreme person, existent, moral phenomena and cherished phenomena are qualitatively superior to the supreme members of other classes, and are such that nothing could possess a higher type of supremacy than they possess. Intuitively, the properties constitutive of

supreme personality (religious holiness) or supreme goodness (moral holiness) constitute a higher or more exalted type of perfection than do the properties constitutive of supreme velocity or supreme heat.

The decompositional analysis of ?holiness? disengages the constitutive properties that compose each of these four complete properties. It specifies the properties that uniquely make up supremacy in the class of persons, that uniquely make up supremacy in the class of moral phenomena, and that uniquely make up supremacy in the class of cherished phenomena and supremacy in the class of existents. The remaining four sections of this paper are mainly devoted to this decompositional analysis. The decompositional analysis is capable of being carried out at great length and depth; in this paper I shall carry out this analysis only as far as is necessary to provide a general idea of the sort of complexity that is involved in each of the four complete properties.

A more concrete understanding of the analogical and decompositional analysis of ?holiness? can be developed in terms of the notion of explication presented in my earlier work, The Felt Meanings of the World: A Metaphysics of Feeling.[6] A full development of this understanding is not possible here, but a brief sketch will show how the ideas in this work can be applied to the preceding remarks about ?holiness?. I argued in this book that each phenomenon is susceptible to both an evocative and imitative explication and a more precise and theoretically rigorous explication, such that the terms used in the former explication refer vaguely and evocatively to the very same items that the terms used in the latter explication refer in a more exact and detailed manner. A person standing awestruck in the midst of a storm may say ?The storm is violent? and refer evocatively and vaguely to the very same complex property of the storm to which the meteorologist refers precisely .and in detail when he says ?The storm has winds of up to 50 m.p.h. produces two inches of rain per hour, etc?. My thesis is that there are not two different properties of the storm, being violent and having a maximum wind velocity of 50 m.p.h. and rainfall of two inches per hour, etc., but one property that is either intuitively evoked (by ?violent?) or theoretically specified.

Applying this distinction to my account of holiness, we may say that ?holiness? or ?sacredness? (as used on some occasion) is an evocative d nation of an intuitively felt property of an item, and that the analolgical) and decompositional analysis of this evocative designation represents (to different degrees) precise explications of the phenomenon evoked. Suppose on some occasion a person affectively intuits something that is religiously holy, and utters ?It is holy!? or ?It has holiness!? The analogical analysis of ?holy? or ?holiness? provides the property the person evocatively designates by his use of the term with a somewhat more precise explication. The expression ?possesses the highest possible type of supremacy in a class?

denotes the same complex property that is denoted more vaguely by his use of ?holiness?, although the former expression is not completely precise since it fails to specify the unique nature or constituents of this property. The relevant decompositional analysis accomplishes this further specification, and is expressed in a form such as ?possesses the properties F, G, H, etc., that are constitutive of supremacy in the class of persons?. What I am suggesting is that ?holiness? does not refer to a simple property of the item, but (in this example) to the same complex property that is denoted more precisely and in greater detail by ?possesses the properties F, G, H, etc. that are constitutive of supremacy in the class of persons?.

The last issue I wish to address in this introductory section concerns the basis for my claim that there are four complete properties of holiness rather than some greater or lesser number. How do I ?prove? that all and only the supreme items in the classes of persons, moral phenomena, cherished phenomena and existents exemplify the highest possible type of supremacy? In the same way that many other sorts of philosophical beliefs are justified, by appeal to our intuitions about the matter. One considers a number of examples intuitively and relies upon one?s intuitions about holiness. It is intuitively evident to me and I believe it will be evident to all those who fully consider the matter that being the perfect existent is a superior type of perfection to being perfectly smooth. Of course, philosophers sometimes disagree about matters of intuition but this is no more a reason for rejecting ?the appeal to intuition? as a method than is the fact that philosophers sometimes disagree about which arguments are sound a reason for rejecting argumentation as a method. Both sorts of disagreement are capable, at least in principle, of being resolved, although, due to the fallibility of the human mind and the complexity of the subjects investigated, definitive and universally accepted resolutions are unlikely. If somebody disagrees with my account in this paper, he or she can rebut it by (i) providing examples that I have not considered of items that are intuitively manifest as holy and (ii) providing counterexamples to the examples I present of allegedly holy items, counter examples that show items of the sort in question are not really holy. This intuitive method can be formulated with more detail and rigour, but that is a task for a paper on method. I turn now to my explication of the four complete properties of holiness.

The religiously holy being possesses the most excellent personal properties. Persons have such excellent properties as consciousness, agency, and capacity for happiness, love and moral goodness; the very highest kind of person has these personal properties in their perfect mode: omniscience, omnipotence, omnibenevolence, perfect happiness, perfect freedom and perfect loving. The

bearer of these properties is God, the divine person. ?God is (religiously) holy? expresses a proposition logically equivalent to that expressed by ?God is the supreme person?, and this in turn expresses a proposition logically equivalent to the one expressed by ?God is omniscient, omnipotent, omni benevolent, perfectly happy, free and loving?. The further analysis of each of these divine properties ? omniscience, etc. belongs to the complete decompositional analysis of religious holiness.

There is a difference between the religiously holy and what is believed to be religiously holy by some cultures and persons. The Babylonians believed Anu and Enlil to be religiously holy, the Egyptians believed the same of Re and Shu, and the Greeks believed likewise of Chronos and Zeus. But these persons are not of the highest possible kind; they suffer some or all of the following defects: limited knowledge, limited power, imperfect happiness, imperfect goodness and imperfect love. These persons were nonetheless believed to be persons of the supreme kind; the Babylonians, etc., could not conceive of a higher kind of person perfect goodness, omniscience, etc., were simply beyond their ken. They mistakenly ascribed the property of being the supreme kind of person to these persons and consequently their religious worship was misdirected.

The claim that Anu, Zeus and the like are not in truth religiously holy is controversial, and to make it more palatable I will ask the reader to consider a certain scenario. Imagine that we discover some person who lives above the earth and who has some exceptional powers, such as being the force behind thunderstorms, lightning, and cloud formation. This person knows more than we do and is superior to us in many other of his personal properties. But this person, like us, is sometimes depressed, vain and greedy and occasionally commits immoral actions. We would not find this person worthy of religious worship, and we would say of anybody who did religiously worship this person that the worshipper had a misconception of the religiously holy. Moreover, we would expect this worshipper not to possess the concept of what is in truth the supreme kind of person an omniscient, omnipotent, etc., person and we would expect this worshipper would cease to worship the storm-gatherer once the worshipper fully and correctly understood the concept of the supreme kind of person.

In the above I have described the property of original or primary religious holiness. This property must be distinguished from derivative religious holiness, which has such forms as being a symbol of the supreme person and being a messenger of the supreme person. Properties of derivative religious holiness are expressed in such phrases as ?holy scripture?, ?holy water?, ?holy temple?, and ?holy man?.

The philosophical discipline in which the complete study of religious holiness is carried out is the philosophy of religion.

The class of moral phenomena include moral duties, laws, acts, objects and characters. A morally holy or sacred duty is a duty of the highest possible sort; it is an unconditional duty, one for which everything should be sacrificed if need be. The word ?holy? or ?sacred? is used to express this property in such moral claims as ?Protecting the natural rights of all humans is our supreme obligation; it is our sacred duty?; ?The pursuit of art is my sacred calling and duty?; ?Soldiers, it is your sacred duty to defend the Fatherland?. A morally holy law is one that is unconditionally imperative; it cannot, under any circumstances, be violated. One expresses this property of laws when one talks of the ?sanctity of law?. A morally holy act is an act of the best possible kind; an example may be making the supreme sacrifice, sacrificing one?s life, for something genuinely worthy of that sacrifice. Sacrificing one?s life for a morally sacred cause is not merely ?good? or ?virtuous? in the ordinary sense but belongs to a different and higher order of moral excellence. It is morally awesome and profoundly moves those aware of it, rendering mere ?moral approval? inappropriate. One is silent before a supreme ethical act. A morally holy object of ethical conduct is an object of the highest possible sort, something that should be preserved or enhanced in preference (if need be) to other possible moral goods. Ascriptions of holiness to objects of our conduct is expressed in such phrases as ?the sanctity of human life? and ?the sacredness of our national institutions?. A person who has or develops a morally holy character is a perfectly good person; such a person is actuated solely by moral principles and performs the morally best action relevant to each situation she is in. Such moral purity is more of an ideal than an actuality for human persons and has its prime instantiation in God.[7]

Moral holiness, the property of being a moral phenomenon of the highest possible kind, is a distinctive property of holiness in that it is both a complete property of holiness and a part of another complete property of holiness, namely, religious holiness. In order to be religiously holy, it is necessary to be morally holy (specifically, to have a perfectly good character), but it is not necessary to be religiously holy or even derivatively religiously holy in order to be morally holy. It is important to make this latter point, since some may confuse derivative religious holiness with moral holiness. Certain duties, acts, etc., that pertain to humans are holy by virtue of their relation to God and others are holy in a different sense by virtue of their moral quality. A pilgrimage to Mecca or a prayer is a ?holy act? or a ?holy duty? in a derivative religious sense but not in a moral sense, whereas ?defending the natural rights

of humans? or ?preserving knowledge for the generations to come? is consistently thought of as a sacred duty in a moral and nonreligious sense. The idea that moral holiness is not religiously derivative may be resisted by some, but there are plainly many instances of ascriptions of moral holiness that are consistent with an atheistic world-view. The belief in the ?sanctity of human life? is consistent with the belief that humans are not made in God?s image and that there is no God; this belief may be based solely on a conviction of the unsurpassable value of the human person and of the natural possession of inviolable rights by humans. Many atheistic poets and writers in the i and early 20th centuries believed their pursuit of art to be a sacred calling and duty, and believed this on the basis of their conviction of the supreme value of art. During the Nazi era, many intensely patriotic Germans believed ?the Fatherland? to be a secular nation that possessed a moral sacredness to it, and they fervently believed it was their ?sacred duty? to defend the Fatherland against the morally inferior forces of the outside world. This is not to say that these moral beliefs are necessarily correct (it may well be doubted that the Fatherland is morally sacred), but that they are consistent?the property of moral sacredness is ascribed without contradiction to phenomena that are not connected to God. Supreme moral value is not logically dependent upon the existence of a supreme person.

The decision as to which moral phenomena are morally holy belongs to the decompositional analysis of moral holiness. Being supreme in the class of moral phenomena is analysable into supremacy in the class of moral duties or laws or actions or objects or characters, and this disjunctive property is in turn analysable into the specific sorts of duties, laws, etc., that are morally supreme. The philosophical discipline to which this analysis of moral holiness belongs is ethics.

The class of phenomena cherished by a person is a class of phenomena each of which possesses the relational property of being cherished by a person. It is possible that among these phenomena are ones that belong to the highest possible order of the cherishable, what is sacred to the person. These phenomena may be people and our relationships with them, experiences, possessions, memories, and the like. The ascription of individually relative holiness or sacredness to such phenomena is made in sentences typified by the following: ?My memories of my husband, who died years ago, are sacred to me?; ?This land (said while pointing to a farm tract) is sacred to me; my family has made a living from it for generations and I will hand it down to my son?; ?My children are sacred to me?I would die for them if need be?. What is being expressed here is that the people, memories, experiences, etc., are not merely cherished by the person but are supremely cherished. It is not

possible that anything could be more cherished by the person; the phenomenon is unconditionally cherished in that the person would not forget or be indifferent to it under any condition and would not sacrifice it for anything else he or she cherishes. The phenomenon stands above the other phenomena the person cherishes as the supreme focus of meaning in his or her life; what is sacred to the person constitutes the ultimate meaning in the person?s life or is an experience, symbol or manifestation of this ultimate meaning. If what is sacred to the person is the ultimate meaning in her life, then it has original or primary individually relative sacredness. If the sacred is an experience, symbol or manifestation of the ultimate meaning in her life, then it has derivative individually relative sacredness. For example, the sacredness to the widow of her memories of her husband is derived from the sacredness to her of her husband himself. But not every person experiences something as sacred to himself; for some, ?nothing is sacred? and all phenomena stand on a more or less uniform plane of the ordinary.

It is manifest that ?sacredness? in the individually relative sense expresses a different complete property of holiness than does ?sacredness? in the religious or moral sense. If I assert something to be morally holy or religiously holy (in the original or derivative sense) I am ascribing a non-individually relative property to it, one that belongs to the phenomenon nondependently upon its relation to me. A temple is holy by virtue of its relation to God, not by virtue of its relation to me, and the sacredness of the duty to pursue art is dependent upon the sacredness of art and not upon the fact of my existence. But If I find certain memories, possessions, experiences, etc., to be sacred, it is clear to me that they are sacred relatively to me and by virtue of their relation to me, such that the cessation of my existence would entail the loss of their sacrality (assuming they do not happen to also be sacred relatively to some other individuals; e.g. the farmland may also be sacred to other members of the family). Of course one?s child may have moral sacredness as a human being, which is not individually relative, but that is something different from the child?s sacredness to his parent, which is something the child possesses only by virtue of being supremely cherished by his parent. His moral sacredness, by contrast, is something he possesses regardless of whether or not his parent supremely cherishes him.

Implicit in these last remarks is the fact that a person may supremely cherish something that is religiously, morally or metaphysically holy, such that what has individually relative holiness for her is the supreme person, existent or a supreme moral phenomenon. The supreme cherishing may or may not be based on the item?s religious, moral or metaphysical holiness. In the case of the parent supremely cherishing her child, it is not so based; the parent does not supremely cherish her child because he is a morally sacred human being, but because he is her child. If the cherishing were based on the child?s moral sacredness, the parent would then supremely cherish all humans equally?which she manifestly does not.

It is only in rare instances that a person supremely cherishes something because it is religiously, morally or metaphysically holy. This sort of cherishing is the precondition for anybody living a holy life, the paradigmic instances of which are the life of the religious mystic, the ethical idealist, and the metaphysical sage, where these phrases are understood in a suitable sense. Every religious mystic supremely cherishes the supreme person because he is the supreme person, every ethical idealist finds morally holy phenomena sacred to herself because they are morally holy, and every metaphysical sage supremely cherishes what is supreme in the class of existents because of its supremacy.

As previously mentioned, what has original individually relative holiness constitutes the ultimate meaning of a person?s life. But a twofold distinction needs to be made here, between a merely subjective ultimate meaning and an objective ultimate meaning. A merely subjective ultimate meaning is something that is sacred to the person but which is either not sacred in itself or not supremely cherished because it is sacred in itself. An objective ultimate meaning is something sacred to the person and both sacred in itself and supremely cherished because it is sacred in itself. In the latter case only does the person?s experience of living an ultimately meaningful life correspond to an ultimate meaningfulness that belongs to reality itself, nonrelatively to and nondependently upon the person?s experience of it.

In my explication of and subsequent reference to the categories of religious and moral holiness, I have been using language that suggests there are religiously and morally holy phenomena. But this is a mere facon de parler. There may, in fact, be no God and no absolute and objective moral values. If this is the case, then it is not possible to live an objectively meaningful religious or moral life, and in these areas nihilism is the appropriate attitude. But it still will be possible to live an objectively meaningful metaphysical life, for there cannot fail to be a supreme existent, as I will indicate in the next section.

Before I end this section, a linguistic observation is in order. In ordinary English, the word ?sacred? rather than the word ?holy? is the term usually used to express the property of being supremely cherished. This reflects a difference in the ordinary rules of use of ?sacred? and ?holy?, where these terms are used without further qualification. The word ?holy? is usually used by itself to express the property of being the supreme person or the property of being the supreme existent, whereas ?sacred? has a wider usage and is normally used not only to express the two abovementioned properties but also the two properties of being morally supreme and being supremely cherished. Thus if I were to follow the niceties of ordinary English it would be more fitting to call the four properties ?types of sacredness? rather than ?types of holiness?, but no harm is done if I use these terms interchangeably for the purposes of this paper.

decompositional analysis of ?individually relative sacredness?. This analysis aims to determine which sorts of items can be supremely cherished by an individual, and covers both objective and merely subjective ultimate meanings as well as the experiences, symbols and manifestations of these meanings. The categories of ultimate meaning and of its experiences, symbols and manifestations are not arbitrary, for objective reality and human nature imposes limits on what can be originally or derivatively supremely cherished. Presumably, nobody can supremely cherish some arbitrary speck of dust that has no significance beyond itself. The study of these categories is accomplished in the discipline or area of philosophy that may be called ?the theory of the meaning of human life?.

What is metaphysically holy is supreme in the class of existents; it is the existent that possesses the highest possible mode of existence. A mode of existence is something?s existence qua possessing certain properties. The mode of existence constitutive of metaphysical holiness is something?s existence qua possessing the properties of permanence, independence, logical necessity, indispensability and reflexivity. The existent whose existence possesses these five properties is the metaphysically holy existent. All other existents?i.e. existents whose existence does not have all of these properties?are not metaphysically holy. This requires some explanation and substantiation.

The first property of the existence of what has metaphysical holiness is permanence, which we may understand as omnitemporality (existing at each temporal present) or eternity (existing in the external present, the standing now). Whatever exists impermanently, at some times and not at others, is by that fact metaphysically unholy or profane.

The second property of the existence of the supreme existent is independence; it is not dependent upon any or all logically contingent existents ? the supreme existent is able to exist even if no logically contingent existent exists. In possible worlds terminology, there is at least one possible world in which the supreme existent exists but in which no logically contingent item exists. Any existent that is dependent is metaphysically profane; it is dependent in that it cannot exist unless at least one other logically contingent item exists.

The third property of the existence of the metaphysically holy is logical necessity, by which I mean the logical impossibility of not existing. The supreme existent exists in every logically possible world. Any existent that is logically contingent is, by virtue of its logical contingency, metaphysically inferior to the supreme existent; it exists in some but not in all logically possible worlds.

Fourth, the existence of the supreme existent is indispensable to the existence of everything else. It is a logically necessary condition of the existence

of all other existents in that no other existent could exist unless the supreme existent existed. If the existence of some item is dispensable or superfluous, then that item is metaphysically unholy. Something that exists superfluously is something that fails to exist in some possible worlds in which other existents exist, and whose existence thereby is not a necessary condition of everything else?s existence.

The fifth property of the existence of whatever possesses the highest mode of existence is reflexivity. What is captured by this notion is that the existence of the supreme existent is nothing other than the existence of existence itself. The supreme existent is (identically) existence itself. This controversial claim requires some elucidation and defence. I will address (briefly, given the scope of this paper) two issues: (i) Does it make sense to say that the supreme existent, which qua member of the class of existents is an existent among existents, is existence itself? (ii) Why must the supreme in the class of existents be existence itself?

(i) Different views have been held about existence, that it is a first-order property as well as a second-order property (Nakhnikian and Salmon, Kaplan, Plantinga and others),[8] that it is not a first-order property but a second-order property (Frege, Russell and others),[9] and that it is not a property at all but something else (a substance, a process, an event, a thing in itself, etc.). It is impossible to formulate a theory of metaphysical holiness that is consistent with all these accounts of existence, so I shall choose the account that I believe to be correct and for which I have argued elsewhere,[10] namely, that existence is a first-order property as well as a second order property. On this view of existence, the assertion that existence itself is an existent allows quantification over a certain property: there is some F such that F is the property of existence. To say that there exists the property of existence is to say that this property is self-exemplifying; the property of existence possesses existence. As a self-exemplifying property, existence is analogous to such properties as being a property (being a property is itself a property), self-identity (the property of self-identity is identical with itself) and being unextended (the property of being unextended is itself unextended).

(ii) Given that a case can be made along the above lines for the thesis that existence is itself something that exists, the next task is to explain why being identical with existence is a property of the supreme existent, This is mediately entailed by the defining property of the metaphysically holy, viz., supremacy in the class of existents. Since supremacy means being the highest that is logically possible in a class, it entails perfection in that class. This is manifest,

since if it is not logically possible for anything to be higher or more excellent in that class, then the supreme item is the perfect member (or a perfect member) of that class. Now perfection entails purity, freedom from admixture with any foreign, inferior or contaminating elements. If something purely is P, it wholly is P, and is not ?diluted? with a foreign element by being in part non-P. A pure member of a class is pure relative to the defining property of the class. It is true of a pure member of a class that it ?wholly is P?, where ?P? stands for the defining property of the class, and it is true of each impure member of the class that it ?partly is P?. The sentence ?Each pure member wholly is P and each impure member partly is P? admits of a twofold interpretation, depending on the sense given to ?is P?. On the first interpretation, the ?is? in ?is P? is the ?is? of predication and the ?P? is an adjective (e.g. ?good?). On this interpretation, the sentence asserts that each pure member wholly possesses the property P and that each impure member partly possesses this property. On the second interpretation, the ?is? is the ?is? of identity and the ?P? is an abstract noun (e.g. ?goodness?). Given this interpretation, the above sentence asserts that each pure member wholly is identical with the property P and that each impure member partly is identical with the property P. Both of these interpretations of the sentence are relevant to defining the purity or impurity of the members of a class in that the sentence must be true of the members of the class on at least one of its interpretations. If it were not, it would be false that the perfect member is pure and the imperfect members impure?which contradicts the notions of perfection and imperfection. Take as an instance the class of moral phenomena, whose defining property is goodness. (Note that this class includes only perfectly or imperfectly good phenomena, and does not include wholly evil or neutral phenomena. The latter are included instead in the class of immoral or amoral phenomena.) It is false of each purely good action (to use one example) that ?the action wholly is goodness? and of each impurely good action that ?the action partly is goodness?, since these actions are not wholly or in part identical with the property of goodness (taken in intension). The identifying interpretation of 'wholly or partly is P' is not the one relevant to these actions. This requires the predicative interpretation to be true of them. We find this is in fact the case, for actions possess rather than are identical with the property of goodness. It is true of each purely good action that 'the action wholly is good' and of each impurely good action that 'the action partly is good'.

When we come to the class of existents, however, we find that the identifying interpretation of 'Each pure member wholly is P and each impure member partly is P' is the interpretation that applies the predicative interpretation does not apply, for with this interpretation the conjunct (of the relevant sentence) that is about each impure member of the class of existents is false. It is true of the pure existent that it wholly possesses

existence, but it is false of each impure existent that it partly possesses existence. Indeed, it is nonsense to say of something that it partly is existing, for that implies it has some parts that exist and other parts that do not exist! To say that something has parts that do not exist (if it makes sense at all) is just to say that it does not have these parts. If the predicative interpretation of the sentence is false, the identifying interpretation must be true. The pure existent is wholly identical with existence, and each tree, person, number, etc., that exists is partly identical with existence. But this assertion is ambiguous and two senses of ?M (wholly or partly) is identical with P? must be distinguished. In one sense, this expression means ?the concrete M is identical with P?, where ?the concrete M? refers to the state of affairs, M-as exemplifying-all-of-its-properties. In a second sense, it means ?the abstract M is identical with P?, where ?the abstract M? refers to M alone, considered in distinction from the properties it possesses. It is the abstract sense of that is relevant to the assertion that the pure existent is wholly identical with existence, for what possesses the properties of existing permanently, independently, reflexively, etc., is the property of existence. Manifestly, the state of affairs of existence-as-exemplifying-existing-permanently-and-independently-and reflexively, etc. is not wholly identical with the property of existence. On the other hand, it is ?M? in the concrete sense that is relevant to the assertion that each impure existent is partly identical with existence. Surely it is incoherent to say that the abstract John, that which possesses all the properties of John, is partly identical with the property of existence. It is rather the case that John-as-exemplifying-all-his-properties is partly identical with existence. Existence is a property of John and thus is a part of the state of affairs, John-as-exemplifying-existence-and-humanity-and-whiteness, etc. ?John is partly existence? means that one of the parts of this state of affairs is the property of existence.

The above reflections provide a way of substantiating and articulating the metaphysical intuition that the pure existent is existence itself, and thus that one of the properties of the existence of the supreme existent is reflexivity. These reflections, as well as our explications of the permanence, independence, logical necessity and indispensability of the existence of the supreme existent, can be deepened if we contrast our conception of the supreme existent with historical accounts of ?the supreme existent?. This contrast is important, since historically the supreme existent was frequently confused with the supreme person and the categories of metaphysical and religious holiness were conflated with each other. This confusion is due mainly to the predominance of monotheistic religions?principally the Jewish, Christian, Islamic and Hindu religions?and their influence upon philosophical thinking and spiritual attitudes and experiences. In Western culture, the Christian influence has been decisive; its confusion of the two categories crystalized in the Anselm-inspired ?perfect being theology?, which defines God as the

perfect being. A recent and lucid expression of this theological tradition can be found in Thomas Morris? essay ?Perfect Being Theology?,[11] in which metaphysical greatness is identified with religious greatness. Morris lists (in ascending order of greatness) the following ?great-making properties?: (a) consciousness, (b) conscious agency, (c) benevolent conscious agency, (d) benevolent conscious agency with significant knowledge, (e) benevolent conscious agency with significant knowledge and power... and so on until we arrive at the perfect personal properties, omniscience, omnipotence, omni benevolence, etc. This provides us, Morris avers, with the concept of ?a greatest possible or maximally perfect being?.[12] But I suggest that the expression ?maximally perfect being? is ambiguous between its existential and quidditative senses and that these two senses have not been clearly distinguished or not been distinguished at all by Morris and others in the tradition of ?perfect being theology?. ?Being? in the existential sense relates to the existence of something, to the fact that it is at all, rather than is not. ?Being? in the quidditative sense relates to the nature of something, to what it is (i.e. to the necessary and accidental qualitative properties of some thing.) The maximally perfect being in the existential sense is the perfect existent, but the maximally perfect being in the quidditative sense is the item which has a perfect nature, the best possible qualitative properties. Existential perfection is a property of the existence of something, whereas quidditative perfection is a property of the thing itself and constitutes the nature of the thing. Manifestly, the principal ?great-making? properties listed by Morris and others in the Anselmian tradition are not properties of the existence of something but constitute the nature of something. It is simply nonsense to assert of something that the existence of the thing is conscious, that the existence of the thing has conscious agency, that the existence of the thing is benevolent and that its existence possesses significant knowledge. The existence of something is not the ?sort of thing? that can be benevolent or cruel or wise or ignorant. If God exists, his existence is not benevolent and all-knowing; rather God himself is benevolent and all-knowing.[13]

Omniscience, omnipotence, omnibenevolence, perfect happiness, etc., are the perfect quidditative properties and comprise the nature of the ?perfect being? in the quidditative sense of? being?. On the other hand, permanence, independence, logical necessity, indispensability and reflexivity are the perfect existential properties and comprise the manner of existing of the ?perfect being? in the existential sense of ?being?. It is the existential

properties alone that are properties of the existence of something. While it is senseless to say that the existence of something is all-knowing, it makes sense to say that its existence is permanent, necessary, independent, indispensable and reflexive.

Once this distinction is clearly made, it becomes apparent that the perfect existent is not the same item as the supreme person, the item with a perfect nature. This is evident if only because of the fact that the pure existent must be existence itself and existence itself is not the ?sort of thing? that can be benevolent or wise or happy. Existence itself transcends these categories and their opposites (cruelty, ignorance, unhappiness). Furthermore, the supreme existent cannot be the supreme person because only the former exists of logical necessity. Existence exists in every logically possible world, but God does not, as I have argued elsewhere.[14] Thirdly, existence itself but not God has an indispensable existence, one that is a logically necessary condition of the existence of anything else. If God does not exist in every logically possible world in which items exist, then his existence is not logically necessary for the existence of any item other than himself.

Although the distinction between existential and personal supremacy has been obscured by the Christian and other monotheistic traditions, it has not gone wholly unnoticed. The concept of metaphysical holiness or its difference from the concept of religious holiness has not been completely, precisely or accurately articulated, but this concept or difference has been partly and poetically glimpsed. The distinction in Taoism between God and Tao is arguably a (partially adequate) poetic attempt to distinguish the supreme in the class of persons from the metaphysically supreme item. (The Way or Tao is not God but ?is like a preface to God?, as is said in Poem #4 of the Tao Te Ching.) The concept of nirvana or emptiness (sunyata) and its distinction from Brahman in some strands of Buddhist thought expresses a partial intimation of this difference. Even in the Christian tradition, there is an occasional recognition of some sort of a distinction; witness Meister Eckhart?s distinction between the person God and the metaphysically greater Godhead, which does not have the property of personality. The Godhead or ?unconditioned being is above God and all distinctions?.[15]

However, it is in nonreligious thought that we find the intuitive sense of metaphysical holiness expressed in firmest outline. A poetic intimation of the metaphysically holy (as something distinct from the religiously holy) is behind Parmenides notion of Being, Plotinus? distinction between the One and God (Nous), Spinoza?s Substance, Schopenhauer?s noumenon (as revealed in mystical ecstasy), and Heidegger?s Being of beings. But the person who has come closest to a grasp of metaphysical holiness and its difference

from religious holiness is the contemporary analytic philosopher Milton Munitz. It is true for Munitz but for none of the above thinkers that the phenomenon intuitively sensed as the metaphysically holy is conceptualized as the existence of things, what Munitz calls ?Existence?,[16] rather than as the One, the Substance, or ?Being? in some unspecified or nonexistential sense. Furthermore, Munitz more clearly than others evinces a recognition of the holiness of Existence. ?Existence, as a mysterium tremendum et fascinans, needs to be recognized as the principal target of religious experience?.[17] Munitz is here using ?religious experience? in a wide sense to refer to a type of experience of which the theistic experience of God is only one subtype. The experience of existence as a mysterium tremendum et fascinans is a religious experience of the nontheistic type. In my terminology, it is an experience of the holy that is metaphysical rather than religious in nature. Munitz comes nearest to capturing this difference in the following passage.

An intensified awareness of Existence is wholly unlike a faith in God and his goodness ... Existence is not a Creative Mind or Power or Person. It has no will or purpose of any kind. It does not possess any type or degree of goodness, love, mercy, or justice... Existence is neither God (in the traditional sense) nor the Universe. ... [O]ne can become aware of Existence by performing the mental act of ?bracketing the Universe?. To bracket the Universe in order to become aware of Existence requires that one focus exclusively on the sheer fact that the Universe exists and not on what the Universe is.[18]

But the genuine profundity of Munitz?s theory of Existence should not blind us to important differences between his theory and the view of metaphysical holiness being advanced in this paper. For one thing, there is no analogue in Munitz?s theory to our distinction between the evocative and precise ways of referring to the metaphysically holy. For us, the evocative expression ?metaphysical holiness? denotes the same complex property that is denoted more precisely by ?permanence, independence, logical necessity, indispensability and reflexivity?, and in this way the objectivity and mind- independence of the metaphysically holy is guaranteed. But for Munitz, ?the mysterium tremendum et fascinans? expresses or refers to a psychological relation between Existence and people who appreciate it.[19] Existence itself is a neutral, brute fact. It is not intrinsically holy. Moreover, Munitz does not conceive of Existence as the supreme existent, as something existentially superior to everything else that exists. ?Existence has no superior degree of reality as compared to the Universe or anything contained in the Universe?.[20] Existence is no more real than they are and is dependent upon their reality.

Another difference is that Munitz?s Existence is not what we denote by ?existence?, namely, a first and second order property. For Munitz, Existence

is neither a property nor a substance nor an event. Rather, it is the whole of all parts of the spatiotemporal Universe, where these parts are understood merely as parts of the Universe and their particular natures are prescinded from. This whole Munitz calls ?the World?. ?The World (as an utterly unique ?Individual?) is (identically) Existence?.[21] From the point of view of my account of existence, Munitz?s Existence is not existence itself but the indeterminately conceived whole of what possesses existence. Specifically, it is the indeterminately conceived whole of the spatiotemporal items that possess existence.*

A still further difference is that Munitz?s Existence does not possess the properties of existing necessarily and indispensably. Indeed, it does not possess any properties at all.[22] But even if we ignore this claim, which is not easy to understand, it is clear that Existence does not possess the properties of logical necessity and indispensability. Existence, for Munitz, pertains only to the spatiotemporal Universe; it is not the existence of disembodied items such as God, numbers and universals. Since there is some world in which no extended universe exists but only God, numbers and universals, or only numbers and universals, it follows that Existence neither exists in every logically possible world nor is indispensable. Indeed, it cannot strictly speaking be existence itself if it is different from the existence of God, numbers and universals.

Despite these differences between Munitz?s theory and ours, it is manifest that Munitz is spiritually attuned to the metaphysically holy and has a clearer view of this type of holiness than other thinkers. Munitz also has some recognition of the possibility of living a life that has an objective and ultimate meaning that is not based on God or absolute moral values. This possibility is real, since even if there is no God and are no absolute moral values one can still supremely cherish the metaphysically holy. Supremely cherishing existence itself provides one?s life with a meaning that is both objective and ultimate in the senses demarcated in section 4. This supreme cherishing of existence will be crystallized in moments of solemn veneration or intense ecstasy and will pervade the rest of one?s life with a more or less constant sense of inner calm and acceptance. The cherishing involves an awareness, realized by itself or accompanying one?s other experiences, that one?s life and everything else are encompassed and made possible by the holy presence of existence itself, much as fish and coral are surrounded and sustained by the sea. This awareness allows for a sort of supremely meaningful life that is known to neither religion nor morality.[23]

[1] A partial exception to this tendency can be found in Richard Swinburne?s The Coherence of Theism (Oxford, 1977), pp. 292-4, where holiness is regarded as a complex property of the divinity. This exception is only partial, since Swinburne shares the common assumption that holiness is exemplifiable only by God.

[2] Max Scheler, Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values (Evanston, 1973), trans. Frings and Funk, p. 108.

[3] Rudolph Otto, The Idea of the Holy (Oxford, 1953), trans. Harvey, p. 5. Otto recognizes some complexity, however, inasmuch as he considers the numinous to be one element in the meaning of ?holiness? as currently used, the other element being the element of complete goodness.

[4] Charles Kielkopf, ?The Sense of the Holy and Ontological Arguments?, The New Scholasticism LVIII (1984), 24.

[5] Ibid. p. 25.

[6] Quentin Smith, The Felt Meanings of the World. A Metaphysics of Feeling (West Lafayette, 1986).

[7] Kant recognized a sort of moral holiness inasmuch as he defined a holy will as a will perfectly in conformity with the moral law. Nevertheless, he did not recognize or did not clearly recognize the logical independence of moral holiness from religious holiness, for his conception of a holy will was developed within the framework of theism. See his Critique of Practical Reason.

[8] George Nakhnikian and Wesley Salmon, ??Exists? as a Predicate?, The Philosophical Review LXVI (1957) 535-42; David Kaplan, ?Bob and Carol and Ted and Alice?, in J. Hintikka et al. eds. Approaches to Natural Language (Boston, 1973); Alvin Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity (Oxford, 1974), chapter VII.

[9] G. Frege, The Foundations of Arithmetic (Oxford, 1950), trans. J. Austin, pp. 64-5; B. Russell, Logic and Knowledge (New York, 1956), ed. R. Marsh, pp. 228-41.

[10] The Felt Meaning of the World, op. cit. chapter iv.

[11] Thomas Morris, ?Perfect Being Theology?, Nous XXI (1987), 19-30.

[12] Ibid. p. 26.

[13] We know of course that some medieval theologians, such as Aquinas, claimed that God is identical with his omniscience and that his omniscience is identical with his omnipotence and that his omniscience and omnipotence are both identical with his existence. But this doctrine is plainly self-contradictory, and its hold on some people?s minds testifies to the predominance of faith over intellectual coherence in some Christian circles.

[14] The Felt Meanings of the World, op. cit pp. 181-4 and n. 77 on pp. 344-5.

[15] Meister Eckhart, trans. R. Blakney (New York, 1941), p. 231.

[16] Milton Munitz, Existence and Logic (New York, 174), p. 197.

[17] Ibid. p. 203.

[18] Munitz, The Ways q Philosophy (New York, 1979), pp. 347 and 344.

[19] Munitz explained this to me in a letter of Nov. 30, 1981

[20] The Ways of Philosophy, op. cit. p. 348.

[21] Existence and Logic, op. cit. p. 200.

* [Note added in proof: In a conversation in Sept., 1988 Munitz allowed that existence may he conceived as a property of a special sort, one that constitutes or indicates the ontological status of something.]

[22] Munitz, Cosmic Understanding (Princeton, 1986), p. 234.

[23] I am grateful to Susan Ament Smith and William Vallicella for helpful comments on an earlier draft.